Tuesday, September 12, 2006
Craig Palmer has written an attention grabbing book review, wherein among other similar types of praise, he proclaims that my argument has achieved “a pinnacle of absurdity.” He also nominates me for the coveted Polemicist Prize (or PP for short). But I must correct a misperception because I shouldn’t accept credit where credit is not justly due. In truth, I didn’t actually make the “absurd” argument that “the widespread existence of human violence is somehow evidence for the enormity of the human potential for peace.” I wholeheartedly agree with Palmer that this is a pretty ridiculous argument. Although I might quibble whether such an argument is really “a pinnacle of absurdity” or just somewhere high on the absurdity ridge, determining its exact absurdity altitude doesn’t much matter in this case: No one will find this argument in my book!
Dear reader, I realize that now you face a dilemma: Who are you going to believe? Palmer proclaims that Fry has achieved the "pinnacle of absurdity" but Fry, humbly, denies being worthy of that accolade.
And here, unfortunately, is another bag of laundry to sort out. I’ve declined the “pinnacle of absurdity” award because, as anyone who looks at my book can see, I don’t actually make the silly argument that Palmer says I do, but do I deserve the Polemicist Prize? What exactly are the “issue poles” that Palmer thinks I polarize anyway? Hobbes versus Rousseau? Evolutionary psychology versus cultural determinism? War versus Peace? Here is the quote from my book which may have given Palmer the idea to try to dismiss me, or, I mean, to "nominate" me as a polemicist:
“In this book, we are confronted in the broadest terms with two rival interpretations of human nature and the potential for peace. According to the first view, humans (especially human males) are a bloodthirsty mob, prone to be violent and warlike by nature. Advocates of this view attempt to link chimpanzee and human violence, discuss sex differences, and recount a litany of barbarity, atrocity, and brutality as incontrovertible evidence that this portrait of humanity is accurate. The validity of this view may seem rather obvious. However, a different--but not polar opposite--perspective is taken here."
Oops. I hope the PP judges don’t notice that last sentence!
Ok, I’ve had my fun. In a more serious vein, I’m disappointed that readers of “Evolutionary Psychology” didn’t receive a book review that covered the topics most relevant to their interests. A reader of Palmer’s review would never suspect that a substantial part of the book deals with evolutionary topics (chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18). This is a pretty amazing omission from a book review written especially for “Evolutionary Psychology.” A reader of Palmer’s review would never imagine that the book presents a model of human aggression based on data from nomadic forager studies--an innovative approach to conflict that leads to really different conclusions than either the “Yanomamö model” or the “Chimpanzee model.” Palmer doesn’t touch these topics--again, amazing omissions. I also must wonder why Palmer does not even mention that the book contains a mathematical reanalysis of the famous and controversial Yanomamö unokai data. (I show my math.) And, unfortunately, a reader of Palmer’s book review would never suspect that the book applies evolutionary theory and is pro-science. It argues that we need to base our evolutionary models of aggression on actual data--on evidence. It also argues that we would be wise to re-examine our assumptions, as best we can, in order to do better science! In short, the topics presumably of most interest to the “Evolutionary Psychology” readership are simply omitted from Palmer’s review. An interesting question for readers to ponder is: What is really going on here?
As of this writing I know of two other online reviews of my 2006 book that cover some of the evolutionary issues not touched upon by Palmer. Both reviews are positive, but not totally so. Although there is much more I could say about Palmer’s review, I won’t. Instead, I’ll maintain a faith that readers can and will make up their own minds about Palmer’s review. I’ll simply suggest that readers interested in the evolution of aggression, a nomadic forager model of the evolutionary past, or a critique of some widely held yet faulty evolutionary assumptions will find useful information about the book in the other reviews. One is by psychologist Peter K. Smith of Goldsmiths College, University of London (His review begins on page 30 of the linked PDF file.) The other review is written by biological anthropologist Agustin Fuentes of the University of Notre Dame. Here also is a link to a description and table of contents of the book itself.
Dear reader, I realize that now you face a dilemma: Who are you going to believe? Palmer proclaims that Fry has achieved the "pinnacle of absurdity" but Fry, humbly, denies being worthy of that accolade.
And here, unfortunately, is another bag of laundry to sort out. I’ve declined the “pinnacle of absurdity” award because, as anyone who looks at my book can see, I don’t actually make the silly argument that Palmer says I do, but do I deserve the Polemicist Prize? What exactly are the “issue poles” that Palmer thinks I polarize anyway? Hobbes versus Rousseau? Evolutionary psychology versus cultural determinism? War versus Peace? Here is the quote from my book which may have given Palmer the idea to try to dismiss me, or, I mean, to "nominate" me as a polemicist:
“In this book, we are confronted in the broadest terms with two rival interpretations of human nature and the potential for peace. According to the first view, humans (especially human males) are a bloodthirsty mob, prone to be violent and warlike by nature. Advocates of this view attempt to link chimpanzee and human violence, discuss sex differences, and recount a litany of barbarity, atrocity, and brutality as incontrovertible evidence that this portrait of humanity is accurate. The validity of this view may seem rather obvious. However, a different--but not polar opposite--perspective is taken here."
Oops. I hope the PP judges don’t notice that last sentence!
Ok, I’ve had my fun. In a more serious vein, I’m disappointed that readers of “Evolutionary Psychology” didn’t receive a book review that covered the topics most relevant to their interests. A reader of Palmer’s review would never suspect that a substantial part of the book deals with evolutionary topics (chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18). This is a pretty amazing omission from a book review written especially for “Evolutionary Psychology.” A reader of Palmer’s review would never imagine that the book presents a model of human aggression based on data from nomadic forager studies--an innovative approach to conflict that leads to really different conclusions than either the “Yanomamö model” or the “Chimpanzee model.” Palmer doesn’t touch these topics--again, amazing omissions. I also must wonder why Palmer does not even mention that the book contains a mathematical reanalysis of the famous and controversial Yanomamö unokai data. (I show my math.) And, unfortunately, a reader of Palmer’s book review would never suspect that the book applies evolutionary theory and is pro-science. It argues that we need to base our evolutionary models of aggression on actual data--on evidence. It also argues that we would be wise to re-examine our assumptions, as best we can, in order to do better science! In short, the topics presumably of most interest to the “Evolutionary Psychology” readership are simply omitted from Palmer’s review. An interesting question for readers to ponder is: What is really going on here?
As of this writing I know of two other online reviews of my 2006 book that cover some of the evolutionary issues not touched upon by Palmer. Both reviews are positive, but not totally so. Although there is much more I could say about Palmer’s review, I won’t. Instead, I’ll maintain a faith that readers can and will make up their own minds about Palmer’s review. I’ll simply suggest that readers interested in the evolution of aggression, a nomadic forager model of the evolutionary past, or a critique of some widely held yet faulty evolutionary assumptions will find useful information about the book in the other reviews. One is by psychologist Peter K. Smith of Goldsmiths College, University of London (His review begins on page 30 of the linked PDF file.) The other review is written by biological anthropologist Agustin Fuentes of the University of Notre Dame. Here also is a link to a description and table of contents of the book itself.
